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Union Coordinated Bargaining
INTRODUCTION
The achievement of goals in the collective bargaining process is not
simply the result of intensive bargaining in good faith as required by
the National Labor Relations Act.' Success at the bargaining table is
a result of strength. The side which exerts the greater leverage has a
superior chance to realize success. Leverage is exercised through the
use of bargaining tactics. The United States Supreme Court has sus-
tained some lawful bargaining tactics even though they may be destruc-
tive of industrial peace when the union is bargaining in good faith. 2
In Insurance Agents' International Union,3 the National Labor Rela-
tions Board thrust itself into the collective bargaining process for the
purpose of regulating union pressure during bargaining. It held that
a union slow-down constituted a violation of the union's statutory bar-
gaining obligation. The Supreme Court reversed, noting:
The presence of economic weapons in reserve, and their actual ex-
ercise on occasion by the parties is part and parcel of the system
that the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts have recognized. Abstract
logical analysis might find inconsistency between the command of
the statute to negotiate toward an agreement in good faith and the
legitimacy of the use of economic weapons, frequently the most
serious effect upon individual workers and productive enterprises,
to induce one party to come to terms desired by the other. But the
truth of the matter is that at the present statutory stage of our na-
tional labor relations policy, the two factors . . . exist side by
side ....
[W]e think the Board approach involves an intrusion into the
substantive aspects of the bargaining process .... [I]f the Board
could regulate the choice of economic weapons that may be used as
1. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1970),
formerly ch. 372, §§ 151-68, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) [hereinafter referred to as the Act]. The
Act was passed over presidential veto on June 23, 1947. The section dealing with the duty
of both unions and employers to bargain in good faith is contained in 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1970):
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating
any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession ....
2. NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
3. 119 N.L.R.B. 768 (1957).
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part of collective bargaining, it would be in a position to exercise
considerable influence upon the substantive terms on which the
parties contract. As the parties' own devices become more limited,
the Government might have to enter even more directly into the
negotiation of collective agreements. Our labor policy is not pres-
ently erected on a foundation of government control of the results
of negotiations.4
In addition to slow-downs, picketing, and employer lockouts, an-
other bargaining tactic has been increasingly used by both sides of the
bargaining table. This practice is "pattern bargaining" aimed at secur-
ing uniformity in contract terms on a company-wide or industry-wide
basis. In some industries, the settlements negotiated-at times virtually
dictated by the giant industry leader-regularly set the pattern while
in other industries the impetus for establishing uniformity in wages
and working conditions is provided by a powerful union.
The very existence of the all-powerful "pace setter" inspires efforts
on the opposite side of the table to mobilize countervailing power.
Moreover, those aligned with the "pace setter" will rarely be content
with the role of passive bystander on matters of such crucial importance
to their existence. Management has coordinated its efforts by the inter-
change of information which frequently involves association or joint-
bargaining with unions or mutual defense pacts.5
On the union side, serious efforts at cooperation to attain bargaining
objectives have been of relatively recent origin. What little settled law
there is in the area of coordinated union bargaining has taken some
contradictory directions, as evidenced by recent developments.
I. THE FACTUAL SITUATION
The typical fact situation arises with a company that has, for ex-
ample, six plants, each of which is either separately certified by the
National Labor Relations Board or voluntarily recognized by the com-
pany. The collective bargaining agreements over the years have had
understandable similarities, but some local differences and different ex-
piration dates remain. These separate employee units may attempt to
engage in coordinated bargaining that consists of an effort to achieve
common bargaining goals by two or more of the unions which bargain
4. 361 U.S. at 489-90.
5. See Pierson, Cooperation Among Managements in Collective Bargaining, 11 .4B.
L.J. 621 (1960).
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separately with a common employer. During the course of the coor-
dinated bargaining, the unions exchange information and other tech-
nical assistance, including the use by their bargaining committee of
persons affiliated with another of the coordinating unions, in prepara-
tion for and during the bargaining.
The coordination starts with the formation of a "council," a loose
federation of all the local unions and units. The council initially acts
as a clearinghouse for the interchange of information regarding local
unit bargaining. Common bargaining demands are formulated that
will ultimately be proposed to the employer.
The next step is to request "council" bargaining or to demand that
the employer bargain simultaneously with all the units from the sep-
arate plants on a collective basis. Generally, the employer declines the
invitation because the multi-union bargaining team can exert greater
pressure at the bargaining table than a single union. Under settled
Board and court law there is nothing unlawful in such a demand or
refusal.6 The request is a non-mandatory subject of bargaining. The
union may propose it, but may not insist upon it to the point of im-
passe or strike. 7 The reason the demand for multi-plant bargaining is
a permissive subject of bargaining and not unrelated to conditions of
employment is that the phrase "conditions of employment" has not
been limited to the actual conditions that affect employees on a daily
basis, but include any matter which will substantially affect those cir-
cumstances."
The most recent affirmation of this rule that multi-unit bargaining
is a non-mandatory subject was the Board decision in Shell Oil Co.9 In
that case, 10,000 employees were represented by unions in some eighty
separate bargaining units. The largest single bargaining representative
was the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union (OCAW). The
OCAW and its locals were the certified bargaining representatives of
6. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 399 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1968); Douds v. Inter-
national Longshoremen's Ass'n, 241 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1957); Central Soya Co., 142 N.L.R.B.
930 (1965); Texlite, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 1972 (1958); International Longshoremen's Ass'n,
118 N.L.R.B. 1481 (1957), enforced on other grounds, 277 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
7. NLRB v. IBEW, 266 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1959); Teamsters Union, 145 N.L.R.B. 865
(1964); Hod Carriers Local 345, 144 N.L.R.B. 978 (1963); Mine Workers Local 15173, 142
N.L.R.B. 930 (1963); Painters Union, 126 N.L.R.B. 997 (1960), enforced, 293 F.2d 133 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824 (1961). ILA, 125 N.L.R.B. 61 (1959), modified and enforced,
286 F.2d 661 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961); General Counsel Admin. Rul.
SR-1049, 47 L.R.R.M. 1113 (1960).
8. Fibreboard v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); United States Pipe& Foundry Co. v. NLRB,
298 F.2d 873, 877-78 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 919 (1962); Westinghouse Elec. Co.,
153 N.L.R.B. 443 (1965).
9. 194 N.L.R.B. No. 166 (1972).
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about 6,000 Shell employees in nineteen separate bargaining units. His-
torically, all the company's collective bargaining agreements, including
those covering the nineteen OCAW units had been negotiated by local
management and local union representatives. Each unit was covered
by a separate contract. Negotiations had not been conducted on a multi-
unit or company-wide basis.
The employees in each unit were covered by five company-wide
fringe benefit plans that were not included in the collective bargain-
ing contracts and were subject to modification at any time. If the com-
pany decided to revise a plan, it would send a letter to all bargaining
representatives and shortly thereafter to all employees. If one or more
unions raised an objection, the company would put the changes into
effect for all employees not represented by a union, and those repre-
sented by a union not objecting. In 1968, when the company revised
the plan, the union president submitted counter-proposals, and asked
that negotiations be conducted simultaneously for all the units repre-
sented by the union. The union, in support of its position, argued that
the company followed a policy of centralized determination and uni-
form implementation of fringe benefit plans and the employees in the
nineteen units represented by the union had a special community of
interest justifying joint bargaining. This common interest was that all
unions were covered by the same plan, and the company's proposals
and union's counter-proposals were identical for all nineteen units.
The trial examiner sympathized with the union since the company
formulated its revisions of the plans on the basis of collective judgment,
and presented them to all the OCAW units on a common basis. There-
fore, it would be proper to require the company to bargain with all
the units together. The examiner held, and the Board acquiesced, that
the parties to collective bargaining agreement may agree, subject to
any later determination of appropriateness under the Act, to the en-
largement or alteration of the bargaining unit or the merger of bar-
gaining units. In the absence of consent, however, neither party could
attempt to force upon the other an enlargement, alteration, or merger
of existing units. Similarly, the Board held in 1969, that the non-man-datory nature of the demand for coordinating bargaining applies to
the company, as well as the union.10
10. F.W. Woolworth Co., 179 N.L.R.B. 748 (1969).
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II. UNIT CLARIFICATION
When faced with an employer's refusal to accede to the union de-
mand for bargaining on a multi-unit basis, the union has attempted
to expand the scope of its bargaining unit by invoking a "unit clarifi-
cation" petition. Traditionally, this petition has been employed to
clarify the existing unit when new or uncertain job classifications were
added. It has also been used when the petitioning party alleged that
expanded operations constituted an accretion to the existing bargain-
ing unit. The Board itself has stated that:
Clarification of a certification or amendment of a unit description
may be in order where a new employee classification has been
created, or an employer's employee operations have been expanded
subsequent to a certification, and the employees involved are nor-
mal accretions to the certified unit.11
Generally, the unit clarification petition is used to clarify the scope
of an existing unit, and would never be appropriate to determine if a
new group properly represents a particular unit. Where a question of
representation exists, the petition will be dismissed, and a petition
seeking a regular election pursuant to section 9(c) of the Act must be
instituted.12 It is interesting to note that such an improper use of this
petition can work against the interests of the rank and file union mem-
bers. The unions have abused the unit clarification procedure by add-
ing employee members simply to offset a rival union's claims for
representation. The petition permits the increase in size of the bargain-
ing unit without giving the employees affected an opportunity to
change or eliminate representatives. On the other hand, a representa-
tion election under section 9(c) protects the employees' freedom of
choice since the ballot contains a choice of which union, if any, is pre-
ferred. The unit clarification ballot contains only two choices-whether
or not the employees want to be part of a multi-plant unit.
The unit clarification petition, from its inception, was used when a
new job classification was created or a new plant was acquired. Both
11. Standard Oil Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1189, 1191 (1964). For a detailed discussion of unit
clarification, see Abodeely, The N.L.R.B. and the Unit Clarification Petition, 117 U. PA.
L. REy. 1075 (1969).
12. News Syndicate Co., 164 N.L.R.B. 422 (1967); Dayton Power and Light Co., 137
N.L.R.B. 337 (1962). § 9(c)(3) of Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)
(1970), states that the Board is empowered to conduct a representation election after a
hearing to decide if a question of representation exists.
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situations would have an effect on the existing bargaining unit. In
1968, in Libbey-Owens Ford Co.,'3 the Board departed from the tradi-
tional use and agreed that the unit clarification election was proper
to determine if a separately certified unit should be included in a multi-
plant unit. Eight of the ten company plants were part of a multi-plant
unit; the two remaining plants were recognized voluntarily by the
company as separate units. The union filed the clarification petition in
order to consolidate the three units into one. The Board granted clari-
fication, and ordered elections to be held in the separate plant units
to determine if the employees favored consolidation. The significance
of the Board's acquiesence, that illustrates a drastic departure from the
traditional use of the unit clarification election, is that the union did
not allege a dispute over job classifications, an accretion, or any other
change from the previously existing employment pattern. The Board
felt justified in allowing the election since there was no issue of repre-
sentation in any of the units. The company had never questioned the
majority status of any union.14 Consequently, the Board expanded the
unit regardless of the employer's opposition and without adequate ex-
amination of the employees' right to choose their own representatives.
Subsequently, the employer refused to bargain with the union after
the Board had certified the consolidated units. Libbey-Owens argued
that the Board exceeded its powers. When the union filed an unfair
labor practice under section 8(a)(5), 15 the trial examiner found there
was an unfair labor practice. The full Board, by a 2-1-2 vote, rejected
the decision of the trial examiner, and dismissed the complaint. 16
Members Fanning and Jenkins adopted the rationale of their prior
dissents' 7 in the unit clarification proceeding, and held that the Board
lacked statutory authority to direct and conduct the self-determination
elections.' 8 Chairman Miller concurred in the result, but disagreed
with the finding that the Board had no authority to conduct the elec-
tions.19 Apparently, the Board will no longer permit the unit clarifica-
tion petition. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the
position taken by the Board in the Libbey-Owens decision of 1968,
13. 169 N.L.R.B. 126 (1968).
14. Id. at 127.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970), states that it is an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of his employees ....
16. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 189 N.L.R.B. No. 138 (1971).
17. Id. Members Fanning and Jenkins dissented in an earlier case. Libbey-Owens Ford
Glass Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 126 (1968).
18. 189 N.L.R.B. No. 138 (1971).
19. Id.
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that it had the authority to add new bargaining units to a multi-plant
unit in a unit clarification proceeding.2 0 But language in the court of
appeal's opinion and the division of the Board's members on the issue
leave considerable doubt whether this authority will be exercised. Be-
fore the court of appeals, the employer argued that the unit clarifica-
tion proceeding was an unauthorized mechanism for the consolidation
of existing bargaining units, and that the Board lacked statutory au-
thority to conduct the self-determination elections in the absence of a
question of representation. The court of appeals rejected the company's
first argument, citing Carey v. Westinghouse Corp.:21
In Carey the representational dispute involved the inclusion of a
disputed category of employees in an existing bargaining unit. The
U.C. Procedure [Unit Clarification Procedure] has traditionally
been used in such cases and in those where additional employees
are claimed as an accretion to an existing unit. In these type cases,
the dispute is representational in that the collective bargaining
representative of certain employees is in issue. In the instant case,
the dispute is not representational in the same sense because the
only dispute relates to unit scope. However, it is representational
in the broader sense that it involves a question of representation
for purposes of collective bargaining in an appropriate unit. The
existence of such representational dispute involving only unit scope
is sufficient to allow the Board to utilize its U.C. procedure.22
As to the company's argument concerning statutory authority the court
of appeals said:
Section 9(b) of the Act provides that "The Board shall decide ...
the unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining ... "
and such determination may be in the absence of a question of
representation. Employee views are highly relevant to such deter-
minations, and, in the absence of statutory prohibition, the Board
has implied powers to solicit such views. Ancillary to its author-
ity to determine . . . all relevant facts, including employee prefer-
ence, by the most practical means available.23
The circuit court of appeals in Libbey-Owens cautioned that elections
to determine employee preference in a unit clarification proceeding
are proper only in the limited situation in which the Board has made
20. United Glass & Ceramic Workers Locals 1, 5, 9, 19, 33, & 418 v. NLRB, 80
L.R.R.M. 2882 (1972).
21. 375 U.S. 261 (1963).
22. 80 L.R.R.M. at 2885 (footnotes omitted).
23. Id. (emphasis added).
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a finding that two or more units are equally appropriate. 24 There was
an identical majority finding in the 1968 Board decision, but since the
Board reopened that decision in the present case and there was no such
majority finding, the case was remanded for a determination of the ap-
propriateness of the units involved. On remand, the court of appeals
directed the Board to determine the appropriateness of the units in-
volved.25 The Board, however, was not instructed to grant the peti-
tion's request for a unit clarification election. 26
The remand will be of no consequence as the present Board majority
will not invoke the unit clarification proceeding in this context. As a
result, the only lawful method available for a union to enlarge the
unit is to file a regular election petition for recognition in the larger
unit.27 Realistically, however, the union will not seek such an election
for various reasons. If the incumbent union loses the election, it neces-
sarily forfeits its certification rights as the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative for the unit involved. An employer must bargain for at least
one year subsequent to certification by the Board.2 The election will
also be difficult to time since the contract bar rules may prevent an
election in one of the other units. The contract bar rule states that a
current and valid contract in a unit will ordinarily prevent the Board
from conducting an election during the term of the contract. It is a
procedural rule that the Board uses to stabilize collective bargaining
agreements. 29
III. "OUTSIDERS" ON THE NEGOTIATING
TEAM-General Electric
Assuming the Board would not permit the enlargement of the unit
by use of the unit clarification petition another coordinated effort of
the unions could be to place a representative of the other locals in the
unit negotiations as "observers." In attempting to formulate a legally
unassailable approach to coordinated bargaining, the unions are try-
24. Id. at 2886.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. The petition would be filed pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1970), which empowers
the Board to conduct an election after a hearing to determine if a question of repre-
sentation exists.
28. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954).
29. NLRB v. Grace Co., 184 F.2d 126, 129 (8th Cir. 1950).
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ing to extract maximum mileage from the well-established rule that
parties have an absolute right to select their own bargaining represen-
tatives. The unions also carefully try to skirt the equally well-settled
Board doctrine that bargaining on a multi-unit basis cannot be com-
pelled. Section 7 of the Act guarantees employees the right "to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing .... "-30 Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(B) protects employers against "restraint and coercion by
unions in selecting representatives for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining .... -81 Although there are some differences between the two
sections, the included protections are broad assurance that neither
management nor the union may select or veto representatives to be em-
ployed by the other side during negotiations. In the landmark case of
General Electric Co. v. NLRB8 2 the Board held that General Electric
Company violated its bargaining duty when it refused to bargain with
a labor team which included representatives from seven other unions
that also bargained with the company. The Board's decision was up-
held by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit insofar as it re-
lated to the company's refusal to bargain with the committee after
receiving the union's formal notice of its desire to reopen the contract
for further negotiation.3
In General Electric Co., the company walked out of a meeting with
the union because it objected to the presence of representatives of
other unions not affiliated with the certified unit. The company's fear
was that the inclusion of these "outsiders" was part of a scheme or de-
vice on the part of the union to force joint, company-wide bargaining.
The union filed a refusal-to-bargain charge against General Electric.
Prior to any hearing on the facts, the Board moved successfully under
section 10(j) of the Act8 4 for a preliminary injunction compelling Gen-
eral Electric to bargain with the expanded union committee. 5 The
company complied under protest.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit felt that the question
was whether a union's inclusion of members of other unions on its
bargaining committee justified the employer's refusal to bargain.36 The
30. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(b) (1970).
32. General Elec. Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 253 (1968).
33. General Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 415 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1969).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 1600) (1970).
35. McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 257 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
36. 412 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1969).
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company contended that the issue was broader, claiming the union
was engaged in an illegal attempt to do away with bargaining unit
lines, and was engaged in a conspiracy.
The circuit court noted that the employees have a right to choose
whomever they wish to represent them in formal labor negotiations
since section 7 of the Act guarantees the right of employees to join to-
gether in labor organizations, and the right to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing.37
Employer efforts to veto a union's designation of bargaining repre-
sentatives have been rejected by the Board and the courts when the
asserted basis for the employer's rejection was that the union represen-
tative was not an employee. 38 The employer efforts were also prohibited
when he maintained the local union alone was certified and when he
alleged the president of the international union was an improper bar-
gaining representative.3 9 When an international representative on the
local's bargaining committee was persona non grata,40 and when the
designation of a local union president as a bargaining representative
for the international would tend to decentralize national bargaining,
the Board has decided against the employer.41 Further, when a union
general organizer, not a member or officer of the union, could not bar-
gain, the union has been successful. 42 There are rare exceptions to the
rule. If the proposed representatives are held to be so tainted by con-
flict that attempts at good faith bargaining were impractical, they will
not be permitted to bargain for the union.43
The circuit court felt that when an employer challenges the em-
ployees' right to choose representatives on a negotiating committee, it
undertakes the considerable burden of showing a "clear and present"
danger to the collective bargaining process.44 Absent any finding of bad
faith or ulterior motive or any evidence that the outsiders are in fact
not bargaining for the employees they represent, the employer is com-
37. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
38. Pueblo Gas & Fuel Co. v. NLRB, 118 F.2d 304, 307-08 (10th Cir. 1941).
39. Roscoe Skipper, Inc., 106 N.L.R.B. 1238, 1241-43 (1953); Oliver Corp., 74 N.L.R.B.
483, 484 (1947).
40. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 471, 471-75 (1962).
41. Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 181, 183 (3d Cir. 1960).
42. NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 198 F.2d 645, 650-51 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 906 (1953).
43. NLRB v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 274 F.2d 376, 379 (3d
Cir. 1960) (ex-union official added to employer committee to gain an advantage over the
union); NLRB v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 182 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1950) (union negotiator
had expressed great personal animosity towards employer); Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.,
108 N.L.R.B. 1555 (1964) (union established company in direct competition with employer).
44. 412 F.2d at 517.
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pelled to bargain. The circuit court recognized that the union has an
interest in using experts to bargain, and in filling that need, no good
reason appears why it may not look to outsiders just as the employer
is free to do.45
It is in the next stage of escalation of the union's attempt to coor-
dinate bargaining that more subtle or sophisticated tactics begin to ap-
pear. This is the stage when both the union and employer sit down at
the bargaining table and prepare to negotiate a contract after the union
has made a demand for multi-plant bargaining that has been refused
by the employer. At this point the union makes contract demands upon
the employer that are intended to achieve the effects of coordinated
bargaining even though bargaining is being conducted on an apparent
unit by unit basis. The union comes to the bargaining table with de-
mands that have been agreed upon with the bargaining council. The
range of possibilities for agreement is limitless, but most typically in-
clude one or more of the following:
1. An agreement to secure identical collective bargaining agreements
in all units.
2. An agreement that each collective bargaining agreement would
have a common expiration date.
3. An agreement that there should be no agreement in any individ-
ual unit until after the expiration date of the contract in the
unit having the latest expiration date. This is often called an
agreement for "simultaneous settlements."
4. An agreement that in any vote to ratify a contract, the members'
votes from each of the units should be pooled rather than going
through the traditional separate unit ratification procedures.
5. An agreement that the local agreements not be binding without
international union approval.
IV. COMMON ExPIRATION DATES AND
SIMULTANEOUS SETrLEMENTS
In answer to the problems posed above, the Fifth Circuit in United
States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB 46 affirmed the Board's decision
that joint insistence by unions in different bargaining units for com-
mon expiration dates in their contracts was lawful. The circuit court
45. Id. at 518.
46. 298 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 919 (1962).
193
Duquesne Law Review
noted that without a common expiration date, any union striking for
a new contract on a different date might have to "bail without a sieve"
while the employer shifted its production activities to the other plant
or plants. 47 In the recent case, AFL-CIO Joint Negotiating Committee
(Phelps Dodge Corp.) v. NLRB,48 the Third Circuit expanded United
States Pipe & Foundry Co. by holding that union insistence upon si-
multaneous settlements in separate employee units was a mandatory
subject of bargaining. When negotiations on a multi-plant basis began,
one local requested multi-unit bargaining. This demand was made in
response to the union's prior public announcement of forcing a com-
pany-wide settlement.49 Among the union's demands were common ex-
piration dates and simultaneous settlements. Subsequently, the union
struck in support of those demands. The Board felt that the strike was
indicative of the union's continued effort to force multi-unit negotia-
tions after the company had refused the demand. Accordingly, it held
that where the union's demand for common expiration dates and si-
multaneous settlements was the only element of a strategy to achieve
a larger bargaining unit, such tactics were illegal.50 The Third Circuit
reversed, observing that:
Separate negotiations were conducted at each of the company's
units, no bargaining was conducted at any unit with regard to
wages, terms, or employment conditions at other locales .... The
Board in this case has equated parallel action by units with an un-
lawful motive. The fact that a demand may have extra-unit effects
does not alter its status as a mandatory subject of bargaining. 51
The significance of the reversal by the court of appeals is that a
union may negotiate to impasse and even strike to enforce demands
for simultaneous settlements and common expiration dates, both man-
datory subjects of bargaining in order to achieve the benefits of a
non-mandatory subject, for example, insistence upon multi-plant nego-
tiations.
From the proposition that it is lawful to insist on common expira-
tion dates, it is only one further step to hold that joint insistence by
the unions involved on the same contract provisions would also be law-
ful. In fact, the Third Circuit, in Phelps Dodge Corp. held that union
47. Id. at 877.
48. 459 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1972).
49. 184 N.L.R.B. No. 106 (1970).
50. Id.
51. 459 F.2d at 378.
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demands for agreement generally applicable to all Phelps Dodge Cor-
poration plants and facilities were not an indication of the union's bad
faith or ulterior motive to enlarge and merge existing separate units.
52
The unions have not escaped judicial warnings concerning their at-
tempts to consolidate bargaining power. The Board has had recent
occasion to remind unions that they, like the employer, cannot come to
the bargaining table with a fixed, inflexible position and be rigidly un-
willing to consider employer counterproposals. 53 Thus, although the
bargaining goal of identical or substantially similar contract language
may not be at odds with the statute as a technical matter, it might
prove difficult to attain under the flexibility requirements of the good
faith company obligation of section 8(d) of the Act.54 This is particu-
larly true if it can be shown that the precise contract language being
insisted upon has no applicability to the unit in question. The flexibil-
ity requirement would also be breached if it could be shown that local
negotiators would agree to drop the language and accept company lan-
guage but for their prior commitment to the joint council.
The Board and the courts have ruled in Standard Oil Co. v. NLRB
55
that a union commits an unfair labor practice when it refuses to bar-
gain concerning execution of an agreement already reached at one
unit, pending the successful completion of negotiations at another unit.
A union cannot condition an agreement within its own bargaining
process upon extraneous issues not related to the union's duty to act
as the exclusive bargaining agent for its members. Such a condition,
nothing less than an attempt to force the employer to capitulate to
the demands of other employees in different units, has been character-
ized both as a refusal to bargain and as an attempt to expand the bar-
gaining unit.56 It is unclear, however, exactly how limited this ruling
is. Its impact can be completely avoided by refusing to come to any
agreement in any unit until there is an agreement by all units. In fact,
the Third Circuit in Phelps Dodge Corp. specifically held that a de-
mand by unions that there be a simultaneous settlement in all units
is a mandatory subject of bargaining. The unions may insist upon such
52. Id. at 376-77.
53. Local 103, 195 N.L.R.B. No. 179 (1972). See also Texas Foundries, Inc. v. NLRB, 211
F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1954).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970), states generally that both the union and the employer
have an obligation to bargain in good faith.
55. 137 N.L.R.B. 690 (1962), enforced, 322 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1963).
56. H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514, 523-26 (1941); Dalton Telephone Co., 187
F.2d 811 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 843 (1951); NLRB v. International Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 77 L.R.R.M. 2366 (1971).
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a demand to the point of impasse and strike over it. As a result, there
is no question that Phelps Dodge Corp. effectively moots Standard Oil
Co.
Phelps Dodge Corp. creates a conflict with the union's duty to bargain
in good faith under section 8(d) of the Act. That section requires both
parties to enter into negotiations with an open mind and with a real
intention to reach an agreement, if possible. There is no requirement
for either party to make concessions. A union that refuses to reach an
agreement in one unit until an agreement is finalized in another cannot
be said to be bargaining with an open mind, or with a real intention
to reach an agreement. In this context, there is no incentive to seriously
bargain when the negotiations in one unit do not parallel those of an-
other. The freedom to negotiate is clearly undermined when it is gov-
erned by progress in another unit. Clearly, the Board will have to
justify the holding in Phelps Dodge Corp. not only with the require-
ments of section 8(b)(3), but will also have to examine the union's con-
duct with respect to its good faith bargaining duty as provided in
section 8(d).
Phelps Dodge Corp. also raises questions concerning the employer's
lockout rights. A lockout is a term applied to an employer's action in
temporarily shutting down his plant, and temporarily laying off em-
ployees during a labor dispute.
In the landmark case, American Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB,5 7 the
United States Supreme Court upheld the legality of an offensive lockout
invoked by the employer after reaching an impasse in negotiations with
the union. The lockout was a means of putting pressure on the union
in support of a legitimate bargaining objective. The Seventh Circuit,
however, responded that the employer violates sections 8(a)(1) and
8(a)(3) if he hires replacements during the lockout. 58 In 1969, the Board
reacted to American Shipbuilding Co. and held that an employer did
not violate the Act by locking out his employees before impasse had
been reached. 59 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
affirmed on the basis that the lockout was not inherently destructive of
employees' rights, especially when the employer had legitimate business
reasons for the lockout.60 The circuit court also based its decision on
the lack of evidence of anti-union animus, and the fact that the major
57. 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
58. Inland Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1971).
59. 171 N.L.R.B. No. 95 (1969).
60. Lane v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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area of dispute was a work jurisdiction issue over which the employer
had suffered a long strike several years previously. As a result, the
right to lockout exists when the employer has a legitimate business
reason and is not guilty of anti-union animus. A possible business
justification for a prolonged strike would place in jeopardy various
contract obligations. If a union may refuse to come to an agreement,
may gain the objective of simultaneous settlements, and may strike
to enforce such demands, as Phelps Dodge Corp. provides, the em-
ployer should be able to lockout once he realizes the union is not inter-
ested in reaching an agreement. Such an employer right should not
depend upon the existence of an impasse in negotiations.
V. INTERNATIONAL UNION APPROVAL OF LOCAL CONTRACTS
Standard Oil Co. did not directly address the issue raised by the pro-
vision in the unions' pact which made settlement subject to interna-
tional approval. It is possible the provision represented an improper
delegation of their authority as statutory bargaining agents. In a recent
decision, Painters Local 850,61 the Board held that the union did not
violate its duty to bargain by its refusal to execute a contract to which
it had tentatively agreed where the local deferred signing the agreement
pending approval by its parent international. The Board held that a
union could lawfully defer execution if the requirements of interna-
tional approval are clearly understood by the parties prior to negotia-
tion. If the international withholds approval there will be no violation
if the delay relates solely to dissatisfaction with contract terms and not
to extraneous issues. 62 The negotiating Local 850 of the glaziers was told
that a rival, Local 751, would press its jurisdictional claim to represent
the glaziers unless Local 850 negotiated standards obtained by Local 751
in comparable areas. Tentative agreement between Local 850 and the
company was reached, but it declined to execute the contract pending
international approval. The trial examiner found no refusal to bargain
under the Standard Oil Co. doctrine since the international's withhold-
ing of approval related to wage rates, an integral part of the contract,
and not to extraneous issues. The Board agreed with the trial examiner
that although the decision to withhold approval may have been influ-
enced chiefly or even solely by the views of Local 751, there was no
61. 177 N.L.R.B. 155 (1969).
62. Id. at 155.
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violation because the decision related to a condition of employment
being negotiated by Local 850 for the unit employees and not to any
terms and conditions of employment elsewhere. Although the Board
is not withdrawing its objection to bargaining about extraneous
issues,63 the decision represents a significant development in union
efforts at bargaining on a multi-plant basis. The international can
simply withhold approval of local agreements until total uniformity is
reached. All the local contracts may then be submitted to the interna-
tional which can effectively regulate approval until the most advanta-
geous terms are met, perhaps ultimately resulting in complete uni-
formity throughout the separate units.
VI. POOLING RATIFICATION VOTES
At times, prior to negotiation, the union will inform the employer
that the agreement reached is subject to a ratification vote of the em-
ployees or members in the bargaining unit.64 If the majority of the
membership approves the negotiated term or the contract as a whole,
then there is binding agreement. Membership includes only those
employees in the particular unit whose bargaining representative is
negotiating with the employer. But, a Board majority has ruled in a
short form decision that a union does not refuse to bargain in violation
of section 8(b)(3) 65 by pooling ratification votes in two separate units
on wage proposals where there was a community of interests between
the two units and the proposals being voted on concerned both units.66
The employer, Lynchburg Foundry Co., had plants in Lynchburg and
Radford, Va. The employees at both plants had been represented by the
63. See NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n 77 L.R.R.M. 2366 (1971).
64. NLRB v. New Britain Mach. Co., 210 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1954); Typographers, Los
Angeles Mailers, Local 9, 155 N.L.R.B. 684 (1965).
65. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1970) states that it is an unfair labor practice for a union to
refuse to bargain with his employer.
66. Locals 2556 & 2969, Steelworkers, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 110 (1971). But cf. Typographers,
Los Angeles Mailers, Local 9, 155 N.L.RB. 684 (1965). The board found a refusal to bargain
and an attempt to force company-wide bargaining where a local deliberately stalled for
nearly a year before submitting a one-plant contract to its members and then encouraged
them to reject it. Lynchburg was distinguished from Standard Oil Co., 37 N.L.R.B. 690
(1962), enforced, 322 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1963), where the union violated § 8(b)(3) in refusing
to execute an agreement reached with the employer, not for dissatisfaction with the
contract terms in the bargaining unit, but upon an "extraneous" matter concerning un-
settled issues in another unit. In Lynchburg, the union negotiators had not agreed to
anything. The union agreement to have both units take a common position on the com-
pany's offer was primarily designed to preserve the existing simultaneous expiration dates,
an objective that has been held directly related, and not extraneous to, legitimate unit
interests. United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 298 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 919 (1962).
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USW for more than twenty-five years with two separate locals. Nego-
tiations were always conducted separately, but in 1967, the employer
agreed to bargain simultaneously with the two locals. The nature of the
consent, however, was not to merge the two units into one. The em-
ployer submitted separate, but identical wage proposals to each bargain-
ing unit. The representatives of the two locals informed the company
that they would take the proposal to their respective memberships and
let them vote on it separately. Prior to the meeting, however, the union
representatives decided to pool the ratification votes as a means of
avoiding split expiration dates in the contracts covering the two
units. The decision to pool was a departure from the past practice of
separately tallying the votes for each local. The employees of the sep-
arate units voted against the proposal. The company argued that the
pooling arrangement was illegal since it was simply an attempt to merge
already existing separate units. The union objective was to preserve
existing simultaneous contract expiration dates, an objective held to be
directly related, and not extraneous, to legitimate union interests. In
Phelps Dodge Corp., the Board felt that insistence on conditioning
agreement upon simultaneous and satisfactory settlement in all units
was only peripherally directed at achieving common expiration dates
and was primarily motivated by a purpose to achieve a merger of the
bargaining units. The Board concluded that the importance of collec-
tive bargaining on questions affecting wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment overrode the apparent expansion of the scope
of the bargaining unit.
VII. CRITICISM
In the series of cases discussed, the Board has compelled employers to
accept as bargaining representatives those whom the union has desig-
nated as the agent of the employees in a particular unit. Representa-
tives of different units have also been permitted to participate as ob-
servers, even though they are strangers to the particular bargaining. 7
Such a position represents a clear misconception of the purposes of
section 9(a) of the Act, which provides that bargaining representatives
must be selected by the majority of the employees in the appropriate
67. General Elec. Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 253 (1968); American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 155 N.L.R.B. 736 (1965), rev'd, 381 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1967); Standard Oil Co., 15
N.L.R.B. 690 (1962).
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unit.68 When the choice is made, the selected representative alone
should have the right and duty to represent the employees. The Board
in Standard Oil Co. failed to recognize the real issue. It held that even
if many of the persons on the union side of the bargaining table did
not represent the employees of the unit in question, the company was
not relieved of its duty to bargain with the duly appointed representa-
tive of the employees of the various units. Even though the Board in
General Electric Co. acknowledged that representatives of other unions
might misuse their position at the bargaining table, it failed to recog-
nize that the participation of outsiders in itself was an inherent abuse
of good faith bargaining. The reasoning of the Board failed to supply a
statutory basis for requiring employers to meet and negotiate with indi-
viduals who do not represent the employees involved. The Board also
failed to meet the problem presented by the statutory provision ex-
pressly excluding outside representatives. Consequently, it is difficult
to see why an employer should be found guilty of a refusal to bargain
because he insists that the bargaining be done exclusively with the rep-
resentatives of the employees as defined by the Act. The employer's
insistence is clearly consistent with section 9(b),6" which imposes upon
the Board a duty to conduct an election when an employer disputes the
selected representatives of the employees. The Board is given the ex-
clusive authority to decide which unit to designate and certify as the
exclusive bargaining representative of the employees. Thus, the em-
ployer is simply responding to the decision of the Board election results,
that designated the appropriate unit with which the employer must
bargain. If then, the Board forces the employer to admit outsiders into
its bargaining sessions after the unions have already agreed to various
common demands, the statutory obligation to bargain should be re-
moved, because a new, uncertified unit has replaced the old unit with-
out a self-determination election. The employer should be given the
right to question the legitimacy of this new unit and petition for
another election in which all employees in the units affected could
vote to determine if the "bargaining team" represents a majority of
employees in the company. In fact, it is incumbent upon the employer
to petition for this new election. If the employer bargains with a group
that does not represent the employees, he violates section 8(a)(2) of the
68. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
69. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970).
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Act. The section prohibits employers from interfering with the em-
ployees' right to bargain through their chosen representatives. 70
The Board's acquiescence in unions' use of representatives from out-
side bargaining units to sit as observers is clearly inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's decision in UMW v. Pennington.71 The Court held
that a union violated section 1 of the Sherman Act,72 when it agreed
with one set of employers to impose a certain wage scale on another
employer and when the effect was to force that other employer out of
business. The crux of the violation is the union-employer agreement,
since there would be no violation if the union acted unilaterally. It is
not clear if the case permits the bargaining council to enter into agree-
ments involving bargaining demands and tactics vis-4-vis a mutual
employer, as the antitrust prohibition extends to union-employer
agreements, not to inter-union agreements. This practice may be
within the kind proscribed when the Supreme Court imposed the re-
quirement that collective bargaining be conducted on a unit by unit
basis:
There is nothing in the labor policy indicating union and the
employers in one bargaining unit are free to bargain about the
wages, hours, and working conditions of other bargaining units or
to attempt to settle these matters for the entire industry. On the
contrary, the duty to bargain unit by unit leads to a quite different
conclusion. The union's obligation to its members would seem
best served if the union retained the ability to respond to each bar-
gaining situation as the individual circumstances might warrant,
without being straight-jacketed by some prior agreement with
favored employers.7 3
70. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1970). The United States Supreme Court has held that an
employer's recognition of a union as exclusive bargaining agent constitutes an unlawful
support in violation of § 8(a)(2) if the union did not represent a majority of the
employees at the time. A good faith belief that the union represented a majority is irrel-
evant and no defense; the mere act of recognizing a minority union violates the Act.
International Ladies Garment Workers Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961). An employer
has the right to refuse to recognize a union until it has been certified by the Board, so
long as he commits no unfair labor practices sufficient to warrant a bargaining order.
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). Furthermore, it is unlawful for an
employer to negotiate an initial contract with a union before the union has signed a
majority of employees, even though the union does have a majority status when the con-
tract is signed. Majestic Weaving Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 859 (1964).
71. 381 U.S. 657 (1965). See also Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal ....
73. 381 U.S. at 666.
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Such a caution places in doubt the legality of inter-union agreements
that impose uniform demands upon a common employer. Inter-union
agreements are not consistent with the concept of unit by unit bargain-
ing that seems to place upon the union a duty of unilateral action vis-
t-vis the common employer.
The Court cautions that it is unlawful for a union to limit its free-
dom to negotiate with one employer as a result of a prior agreement
with a second employer. There seems little difference between that
kind of unlawful agreement and an inter-union agreement to limit
its freedom to bargain with a mutual employer. Both situations violate
the requirement of unit by unit bargaining.
Although the case law provides that the parties may consent to an
enlargement or alteration of a bargaining unit, neither party may at-
tempt to force upon the other an enlargement or expansion. 74 The
employer should not be permitted to consent to multi-unit bargaining
because the employees' rights under section 7 would be clearly in-
fringed. Section 7 of the Act guarantees employees the right to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing. The em-
ployee rights are infringed because the expanded unit does not ade-
quately protect the employees' right to bargain through their chosen
representatives. Such a proposal undermines employer-union efforts to
maintain industrial peace. It is the conclusion, however, that must be
drawn in order to remain consistent with section 7.
Union attempts at coordinating bargaining is symptomatic of the
increasing tendency towards bigness and power. It is apparent that co-
ordinated bargaining will contribute to the movement of the bargain-
ing process away from the shop level where most of the initial problems
will continue to arise and may be most effectively settled. To that
extent the movement may be counter-productive to the genuine day to
day needs and desires of the employee. Although such a conclusion may
be subjective, there is one result that is certain. The prospect of indus-
try-wide strikes will increase, and this in turn will lead to an in-
creased government role in collective bargaining. These results can be
directly attributed to the NLRB's attempt to adjust economic power be-
tween labor organizations and management. Although this claim has been
rejected,75 there is certainly evidence to support this argument. The
74. Shell Oil Co., 194 N.L.R.B. No. 166 (1972).
75. General Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 512, 519 (2d Cir. 1969).
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Board has in effect intruded into the substantive aspects of the bargain-
ing process. This conduct by the Board is inconsistent with a national
labor policy that favors freedom in the collective bargaining process
and that fosters agreements reached independently between the parties.
WILLIAM C. WOODWARD, J.
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